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Sixth Special Report 
On 17 July 2009 the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee published its 
Seventh Report of Session 2008–09, Spend, spend, spend? – the mismanagement of the 
Learning and Skills Council's capital programme in further education colleges [HC 530]. On 
29 September 2009 the Committee received a memorandum from the Government which 
contained a response to the Report. The memorandum is published as an appendix to this 
Report. 
 
Appendix: Government response 
Introduction 
In 2001, the newly established Learning and Skills Council (LSC) took over an ongoing 
programme of capital works in the further education sector. The programme was needed 
to renew an estate that was too large, with much of it in poor condition and no longer fit 
for modern educational purposes, affecting the reputation of the sector. By March 2008, a 
total of £4.2 billion of projects had been approved ‘in detail’, including grant support from 
the LSC of £1.7 billion. To date about half of the estate has been renewed. 
The Government will invest £1.7 billion over this Spending Review period transforming 
the estate for learners. Nearly 700 projects in 330 colleges throughout England have been 
completed or agreed. This year’s budget will be supporting 178 projects. These projects will 
be at varying stages of development; ranging from those which are just beginning on site to 
those which completed this summer in time for the new academic year. In addition to 
these projects, a further 30 are to start building shortly which includes the 12 projects 
announced on the 28 August earlier this year.  
By December 2008, it was determined that more schemes were in preparation than could 
be funded in this spending round. Sir Andrew Foster was appointed to conduct an 
independent review and reached the view that ‘a good policy had been compromised by 
the manner of its implementation’. Sir Andrew Foster went on to conclude that the policy 
intent to transform the FE estate was clear and positive, but that the implementation did 
not include a robust financial strategy or a regional or national approach to prioritisation. 
Before these problems arose, the programme had achieved a great deal: an overall 
reduction in the size of the estate, improved quality of the buildings and a contribution to 
increased learner participation. The Government’s investment has genuinely transformed 
the provision available to learners and employers in communities up and down the 
country. There is wide consensus regarding the aims of the policy, including from Sir 
Andrew Foster, who said in his report that the FE Capital programme is a “good policy” 
that has delivered “benefits for countless students, staff and communities”. 
The Department for Business, Innovation Universities and Skills (BIS) is continuing to 
take forward the Foster recommendations to ensure that lessons are learned regarding the 
overall financial management of both the LSC and all of BIS’s arms length bodies. 
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In response to Foster, a dedicated project management group across both the LSC and BIS 
has been established, ensuring close, joint working. In addition, open and early 
consultation has been held with the sector, leading to the introduction of needs-based 
prioritisation that has enabled the most urgent capital projects to begin this summer. The 
LSC has built up extensive information about all capital schemes, including an audit of all 
capital commitments. The LSC has also developed a robust forecasting model, and is in the 
process of introducing new measures to strengthen the financial management of the 
programme. Work continues to ensure transition to the new arrangements is as smooth as 
possible, and is underpinned by a substantial programme. Through these measures BIS has 
confidence that the programme is now on a firm footing for the future and that the 
previous problems with the programme will not be repeated. 
The LSC has strengthened financial controls in a number of ways. A particular focus of this 
work has been to ensure that the right relationship exists between the centre and the 
regions of the LSC and that processes are in place for escalating rapidly to senior BIS 
officials any financial issues or failure of control. 
BIS recognises the importance of achieving effective delivery through partners. BIS will 
take into account the conclusions of the NDPB review conducted by the then Permanent 
Secretary, Ian Watmore of the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, in 
determining the nature of approach that BIS should adopt to its sponsorship 
responsibilities. Taking forward this work, BIS wishes to ensure that the improvement in 
processes and systems are applied across BIS on a systematic basis for all delivery partners, 
integrating all the good practice already identified.  
Response to the Conclusions and Recommendations 
Building Colleges for the Future and the 2009 Foster Review  
1. We commend Sir Andrew Foster for his thorough review of the FE capital 
programme and his perceptive description of events in 2008 and 2009. We have drawn 
on his work throughout this report. (Paragraph 18) 
The Government and the LSC have accepted Sir Andrew Foster’s recommendations in full 
and as described later, are making good progress in implementing them. 
 The Capital Affordability Review: failure of management systems  
2. We conclude that the treatment of the February 2008 Capital Affordability Review 
demonstrates what was going wrong both within the LSC and between the LSC and 
DIUS. There were failures in communication within and between the two organisations 
and a shared—but flawed—assumption was formed that this was an in-year issue that 
had no long-term implications. A central element in this was the failure of the LSC's 
then Chief Executive and Chairman to have a process where they regularly considered 
the future direction of a key programme which was to consume up to 9.2% of the LSC's 
total budget by 2009–10. (Paragraph 33)  
3. The unprecedented level of capital expenditure on the FE estate between 2005 and 
2008 can be regarded as a great achievement by the Government and by the LSC. On 
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the basis of the 2009 Foster Review and the evidence we have taken we conclude that 
there was a catastrophic mismanagement of the LSC capital budget during 2008 and 
neglect of oversight by those in the most senior positions in the LSC. The fact that the 
situation changed quickly does not excuse the lack of recognition of crucial warning 
signs, in particular the February 2008 Capital Affordability Review. (Paragraph 40)  
Recognising the deficiencies in how the LSC had managed the programme, its former 
Chief Executive, Mark Haysom, resigned on Monday 23 March 2009. Geoff Russell was 
appointed as acting Chief Executive on the same day. 
Under the new leadership of Mr Russell, a dedicated project management group across 
both the LSC and BIS has been established fostering close, joint working. The LSC has also 
developed a robust forecasting model, and is introducing new measures to strengthen the 
financial management of the programme. Through these new arrangements, the LSC—and 
its successor, the Skills Funding Agency (SFA)—will manage the capital budget with far 
greater precision, and will be in a position to identify and act upon any warning signs.  
The LSC has improved its risk management procedures. Overall responsibility for risk 
management is now the responsibility of all Directors and a monthly Performance Report 
has been developed to align personal programme responsibility (rather than committee 
responsibility) with delivery/budget data and the identified risks to performance. A weekly 
horizon scanning process has been implemented where each regional and national 
Director reports emerging risks that are shared with all senior management and also fed 
into the Performance Report. The Performance Report goes to the Management Group, 
the National Council and to BIS.  
Lack of a prioritisation mechanism  
4. The evidence we took revealed a strange world in which staff at the LSC believed 
prioritisation would not be needed in the short to medium term because the 
programme had historically been underspending. Hence they could defer difficult 
decisions, for example on how to rank projects within and across regions, to someone 
else—perhaps the LSC's successor organisations. But this meant that the programme in 
the end operated on a first-come, first-served basis, with no consideration given either 
to need or wider departmental or government policy objectives. Some colleges received 
funding for iconic buildings when something much cheaper would have served 
perfectly well. Other worthy projects, perhaps in areas of greater deprivation, will now 
not be funded at all. (Paragraph 49)  
5. This should not have happened and must not happen again. We recommend that it 
should be a requirement for all national capital programmes to have an agreed 
mechanism for prioritisation built in to them from the start, even if they initially under 
spent. In this case the perceived need within the LSC to "use or lose in-year budgets" 
was a key factor in the Council's decision to seek to build up demand in the early stages 
of the programme, a build-up which proved impossible to manage. Consideration 
should be given to how to mitigate the tendency to focus on in-year budgets and 
therefore make short-term decisions, for example enabling greater flexibility to carry-
over funds in the early stages of a programme to ensure that growth is managed 
sustainably. (Paragraph 50)  
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There was a clear budget for the capital programme. It was the LSC’s responsibility to 
manage within it. The programme had clear criteria for assessing proposals coming 
forward. These included national and regional priorities, as well as the educational case and 
value for money. It was the absence of effective financial forecasting and control that led to 
the failure to spot the gap between demand and supply as quickly as it should have. 
Following the recommendations set out in Sir Andrew Foster’s report, a clear process for 
allocating the additional funding and the ongoing management of the programme was 
developed. This included employing consultants to gain robust information on all existing 
commitments and project costs. Consultants PricewaterhouseCoopers were also employed 
to carry out a prioritisation exercise based on criteria agreed with the Association of 
Colleges reference panel. On Friday 26th June 2009 the LSC announced, after a 
prioritisation process which had been agreed with the sector, 13 colleges would proceed to 
the next stage - a cost reduction exercise. Successful negotiations have now completed and 
it has been announced that the thirteen college capital projects had been given final 
approval and that construction would begin immediately.  
A prioritisation mechanism will also be applied to all future investment decisions – subject 
to further consultation with the sector. The current intention is to consult with the sector 
this autumn to produce a mechanism for deciding how best to move forward in the next 
spending round, dependent upon the level of investment secured. All decisions on existing 
and future projects have been made taking into account the affordability and impact across 
the whole life of the project and spending periods. 
Role of LSC in liaising with the regions  
6. We conclude that the senior management of the LSC made two significant mistakes 
in dealing with the regions during 2008. They should have been consulting Regional 
Directors much more frequently about the programme to establish likely overspends, 
whether or not they were aware at the time of the Edwards report and its implications, 
and Regional Directors should have been given a responsibility to monitor and report 
on the number of projects coming through the system. (Paragraph 54)  
It is clear that there was insufficient financial control within the LSC of the capital 
programme. Geoff Russell, on taking up post as acting Chief Executive in March 2009, took 
a number of actions to ensure greater accountability and control. He appointed David 
Hughes as National Projects Director - making him directly responsible and accountable 
for the capital programme. He implemented robust forecasting and budget control and 
also ensured the approval process was more centralised with all projects now being 
approved by the Capital Committee and the National LSC Council. 
BIS and the LSC have also already strengthened financial controls in a number of ways. A 
particular focus of this work has been to ensure that the right relationship exists between 
the centre and the regions of the LSC Moving forward, the new Skills Funding Agency will 
benefit from a number of structural and procedural qualities that mark it out from the LSC, 
and demonstrate material improvements in the environment for risk management. As 
opposed to the LSC, structurally the Skills Funding Agency will be a nationally consistent 
organisation, with centralised funding systems which will ensure the easy availability of 
comprehensive and correct budget reports. 
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Risk management  
7. The fact that the LSC's weak risk management system was being addressed as these 
events were unfolding, and that even as a result of this the capital programme was not 
identified as a major potential problem is astounding. In this context we repeat our 
criticism that DIUS did not place key risks it had identified in its Accounts—including 
poor risk management at the LSC—in its 2008 Departmental Report. (Paragraph 63)  
BIS and the LSC has strengthened financial controls in a number of ways and has reviewed 
interaction between BIS and the LSC. Following the Foster Report, strengthened 
arrangements have been put in place for risk management. Overall responsibility for risk 
management is now the responsibility of all Directors and a monthly Performance Report 
has been developed to align personal programme responsibility (rather than committee 
responsibility) with delivery/budget data and the identified risks to performance. A weekly 
horizon scanning process has been implemented where each regional and national 
Director reports emerging risks that are shared with all senior management and also fed 
into the Performance Report. The Performance Report goes to the Management Group, 
the National Council and to BIS.  
The reason for the difference between the risks recorded in the Departmental Report and 
those set out in the Statement on Internal Control in the Annual Resource Accounts is that 
the former seeks to identify the most significant strategic risks that the Department will 
need to manage to meet its objectives, while the latter records specific issues of internal 
control that have already been identified. The Departmental Annual Report 2009 sets out 
the strategic risks facing the Department at page 99, which included the broader risk of 
weaknesses in governance arrangements with delivery partners that could fail to identify 
and address poor performance or delivery failure in the supply chain. 
The role of the National Council and the Chairman of the LSC  
8. We note the points made by Chris Banks about the position of the LSC Council and 
his own position as Chairman of that Council. While the LSC Council delegated 
responsibility for management to the executive team it retained a responsibility to 
provide high-level oversight, set overall strategy and to challenge and question what the 
management team were doing, and the Chairman of the Council should have been 
leading the Council in achieving this. The Chairman and the Council clearly failed in 
this oversight during 2008. (Paragraph 69)  
Sir Andrew’s report is clear that “the most significant responsibility for these problems 
rests with failures in the general management and financial management of the LSC.” That 
is why it was right for the Chief Executive to take primary responsibility for what was a 
management failure. The report does also comment on governance, risk management, and 
the role of the Council. The Chairman and Council members will be reviewing lessons 
learnt, in order to strengthen corporate governance for the future and ensure that these 
problems cannot recur. 
The new Skills Funding Agency will benefit from a number of structural and procedural 
qualities that mark it out from the LSC, and demonstrate material improvements in the 
environment for risk management. As opposed to the LSC, structurally the Skills Funding 
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Agency will be a nationally consistent organisation, with centralised funding systems which 
will ensure the easy availability of comprehensive and correct budget reports.  
The Skills Funding Agency will be part of BIS, and there will be clear governance, 
accountability and management chains from BIS to the Chief Executive of Skills Funding. 
This means there will be shorter timescales between the identification of risks through a 
clear escalation route and the implementation of consistent mitigating action.  
Communications between the LSC and colleges  
9. The extent to which individual colleges were urged to increase the scale of particular 
projects may be a matter of some debate between the LSC and the colleges themselves. 
But given the historically cautious expectations of the majority of the FE sector, it is in 
our view highly unlikely that colleges would have "bigged up" their projects without 
direct encouragement from regional officers or national directors at the LSC. The 
evidence appears more than anecdotal that LSC was encouraging bigger and bigger 
schemes to come forward: the use of phrases such as "once-in-a-generation 
opportunity" and "a strong association between new buildings and high achievement" 
was irresponsible and bound to build up excess demand that could not be satisfied and 
the LSC as a whole, and those individuals involved, should accept responsibility for this. 
(Paragraph 77)  
Sir Andrew Foster says that in some cases the LSC has actively encouraged colleges to be 
increasingly ambitious and this, coupled with past experience of success at in-principle 
approval being followed by success at detailed approval, may have led to colleges 
progressing their projects far too quickly. Sir Andrew says that colleges may have put too 
much store by success at in-principle approval as a result and more could have been done 
to correct this. As part of the work in putting the programme back on a stronger footing 
the LSC now has complete oversight of the affordability all projects across their lifetime 
which includes having robust management information on all projects at the Application 
in Principle Stage. 
DIUS oversight of the LSC  
10. We ask the LSC and DBIS to clarify the remark made in the minutes of the LSC 
External Advisory Group meeting in September 2008 that Ministers were considering 
risks associated with the FE College Capital programme. (Paragraph 84)  
The discussion minuted at the External Advisory Group meeting related to concerns about 
the impact of the economic downturn on the introduction of the new Skills Capital Funds 
for non-college providers. With increasing numbers of unemployed, demand for skills 
training was expected to increase. However, with the economic downturn, the ability of 
private providers to contribute to capital projects was going to be limited. The upshot – 
and risk under consideration by the then DIUS Ministers – was the potential over-demand 
by private providers on the small dedicated fund introduced to address specialist facilities 
in non-college providers. 
11. Lessons must be learned by DBIS and across Government from the events at the 
LSC in 2008. DIUS clearly failed in its oversight duties. As we noted earlier in this 
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Report the same management problems that befell LSC were also there in DIUS—a key 
official did not report back to more senior staff about the Capital Affordability Review; 
there was a wider lack of challenge; and a total failure to pick-up messages from the 
sector (or apply common sense) about the scale of commitments which were being 
made. (Paragraph 87)  
12. The then Secretary of State told us that "the theory of NDPBs when they were first 
set up, that they protect ministers from the political flack when things go wrong, does 
not appear to work as well as some of us might have liked […] My conclusion is you 
should use NDPB’s where they are necessary, but not otherwise." Events at the LSC 
show that NDPB’s can diffuse political and financial accountability to such an extent 
that serious problems are not identified or addressed and responsibility for failure is at 
best unclear. In this case the situation was made worse by the prospect of the NDPB 
being wound-up; the Department should have realised that this could affect operations 
and ensured that its oversight was effective. We conclude that a review of the operation 
of NDPB’s not just across DIUS (now DBIS) but the whole of Government is urgently 
required. (Paragraph 88)  
BIS has made good progress implementing of all the Foster recommendations. This has 
included the change from a demand based capital process, to a needs based capital process. 
A joint dedicated project team was put in place, which has strengthened the ability to 
monitor and challenge the LSC, whilst also working alongside them. The LSC has also 
taken on board the Foster recommendations, and has introduced new management 
arrangements. 
Following the Foster report John Denham asked Ian Watmore to carry out a review of 
DIUS’s relationships with arms length bodies to ensure clarity about accountability and 
responsibility. The review made a number of recommendations, designed to strengthen 
management information and oversight arrangements on key delivery programmes; clarify 
internal roles and respective roles between DIUS and its arm’s length bodies; improve 
consistency of approach within DIUS to aid identification of the key delivery risks; support 
ongoing work to build professional capacity in the Department’s sponsor teams; and 
improve the rigour of sponsorship arrangements. In sharing the report with Phil Willis, 
Chairman of the Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, it was confirmed 
that the review’s conclusions would be taken into account in determining the nature of the 
approach that BIS should adopt to its sponsorship responsibilities. 
This work is ongoing and will be shared with other Departments in due course. It will be 
integrated with the good practice already identified and will be synthesized into a single 
process for BIS. One of the main purposes of this work is to ensure that, at every level of 
the BIS there are proper processes and systems in place to manage risk on a proportionate 
basis, to engage with our delivery partners and to elevate issues when appropriate.  
13. As far as we can see DCSF was a silent partner in this situation, though it is clear 
that within the LSC the splitting of the capital budget was regarded as a critical factor in 
making management of the programme more difficult. We note the points made by the 
157 Group about the possible transfer of some projects to the Building Schools for the 
Future programme and urge DBIS and DCSF to work together to establish whether this 
is an appropriate way forward. We also recommend that the proposal for a single 
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college capital budget using pooled DCSF and DBIS funds is investigated with the 
outcome of the review reported to Parliament in the form of a Written Ministerial 
Statement. (Paragraph 93)  
In the White Paper Raising Expectations: Enabling the System to Deliver a commitment was 
given that those colleges that designate as legally distinct sixth form college corporations 
would be eligible to access sources of capital funding – including Building Schools for the 
Future - via the local authority. It is also the Government’s intention to proceed with a 
single capital fund for all general FE colleges which would be administered by the Skills 
Funding Agency. 
It is proposed that there continues to be a single-track approval process for FE capital 
projects, and that a joint process is created between the YPLA and the Skills Funding 
Agency to scrutinise and decide on all proposals for FE modernisation covering 16–19, 
including FE modernisation proposals and capital proposals from other work-based 
learning providers that are delivering publicly-funded provision, for example in support of 
apprenticeships. 
Discussions about final arrangements are ongoing. 
The NAO report in July 2008  
14. We conclude that, while the NAO rightly identified some of the issues in its July 
2008 Report, the facts that the report (1) did not give a sense of the urgency with which 
a prioritisation mechanism was required and (2) did not put the problem in the context 
of poor risk management diluted its impact. The fact that paragraph 14 of the Report's 
Summary addressed prioritisation in the context of the completion of the programme 
by 2016 by the LSC's "successor bodies", alongside the positive tone of the press notice, 
pandered to the view that was then prevalent within the LSC that prioritisation was a 
medium and longer-term problem, not something that had to be done immediately. 
(Paragraph 102)  
15. Given the seriousness of the mistakes that were made the NAO report appears in 
hindsight to be surprisingly positive: we find it hard to reconcile the fundamental 
problems that became apparent with LSC's capital management, in particular the lack 
of national prioritisation and planning for this high-cost, high-profile programme, 
with the tone of the report. This is all the more surprising given that the NAO had sight 
of the Capital Affordability Review. We conclude that if the NAO had produced a more 
hard-hitting report in July the worst of the over-commitment would have been averted. 
(Paragraph 103)  
The conclusion is noted, but is not for this Department to comment upon.  
Next steps  
16. As it turns out 2008 was indeed a once-in-a-generation opportunity for FE capital 
expenditure, though not in the way that the LSC and DIUS intended. We are now left 
with a situation in which funding is scarce and worthy cases cannot be prioritised. Out 
of over 180 projects submitted to the LSC—of which a significant proportion had 
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received Approval in Principle—only 13 have proceeded to the next stage of 
consideration. Even they have all been asked to "substantially reduce the cost and scope 
of their projects and review other sources of funding". For the others there is "no 
prospect of getting their projects funded this CSR." (Paragraph 120)  
17. This is a difficult situation for all concerned. LSC is making its best efforts to 
address this prioritisation in a fair way but given the inadequacies of the demand-led 
process our inquiry has identified, we believe the prioritisation and criteria on which 
future funding should be committed should take account of all factors relevant to the 
bids available. This includes the impact of the capital project on the added value of the 
college's programmes and the vocational development of its student body as well as the 
impact of the project on the regeneration of the area in which it sits as well as the 
potential areas from which it recruits its students not simply the chronological status of 
bids at the time the programme was put on hold. We therefore have concerns about the 
application of the readiness gateway which we do not believe should be applied in the 
future when making decisions about funding. (Paragraph 121)  
Projects going forward in this spending round were scored against the following 
prioritisation criteria: 
• Education and skills impact  
• Contribution to local economic and regeneration priorities  
• Co-dependency with 3rd parties  
• Condition of estate  
• Value for money. 
Similar criteria will be used in future, subject to further consultation with the sector.  
In support of Government’s fiscal stimulus policy to help kick-start the economy, the 
‘readiness to proceed’ criterion was introduced into the approvals process. BIS does not 
anticipate using ‘readiness’ as a criterion in the future, it cannot be ruled it out in case of a 
similar national economic situation arising, where such stimuli could once again be 
usefully employed.  
18. LSC must move to a position where it can show its working on the extent to which 
the existing budget is committed, the value of projects being considered and how 
projects have been evaluated. It is particularly disappointing that the announcement of 
further delays was made only two days before the long-anticipated 3 June Council 
meeting and we recommend that LSC immediately takes steps to set out the timetable 
for the remainder of the evaluation process. (Paragraph 122)  
The LSC and BIS have put together a joint programme team who have worked closely over 
recent months to ensure the information held on the capital programme is rigorous. 
Independent consultants have thoroughly audited all the financial information which has 
enabled payment profiles of all commitments to be developed across the life time of all 
existing commitments. The LSC also employed independent property specialists to assess 
10 Government response to the IUSS Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2008--09 
 
all projects which have led to a detailed understanding of the cost incurred in developing 
bids. 
The LSC appointed consultants also made a series of recommendations to improve LSC 
processes and systems, providing an improved degree of transparency and assurance. The 
processes that have been introduced will ensure: 
• secure financial management of the programme; 
• the ability to map in-year and forward forecasting of expenditure;  
• expectations of funding within the sector can be assessed; and  
• priority of learning and skills outcomes are supported. 
For colleges not selected to proceed this year, the next steps will start this autumn when the 
LSC will further consult with the sector to agree a robust, fair and transparent process for 
prioritising the capital investment programme for the next Spending Review period, 
starting in 2011–12. The size and scope of the programme will depend on the outcome of 
the next Spending Review. 
19. The commitment that "no college will become insolvent as a result of capital project 
delays" does not go far enough. DBIS will now need to work with the LSC to ensure that 
compensation arrangements for sunk costs are settled as a matter of urgency and the 
presumption must be that those colleges which incurred significant expenditure 
moving from Approval in Principle towards Approval in Detail have those costs fully 
reimbursed. Funding for this should not be top-sliced off the overall capital budget. 
(Paragraph 134)  
The policy decision about how sunk costs would be treated had already been made by the 
time the Select Committee’s report had been published. It has been agreed that the LSC will 
reimburse all costs it had committed to under its fee support arrangement. In addition, the 
LSC will ensure that no college will be allowed to become insolvent as a result of decisions 
taken on the capital programme. 
The LSC has a long-standing, understood and published position of fee support for 
colleges developing their capital proposals. It will honour all fee support due under that 
policy. In this way it has already provided substantial support to colleges in meeting the 
costs of developing projects. It has been clear that it will pay colleges any contributions to 
development costs which were previously agreed but remain outstanding. 
20. The Department and the LSC should be making every effort to help those colleges 
which will not receive funding in this spending round. We therefore endorse the 
proposal by the Association of Colleges for a small amount of government funding to 
support colleges in raising alternative finance for their projects and welcome the 
announcement by the LSC of the creation of a small projects fund. We see the potential 
involvement of HEFCE as particularly relevant given the ever-increasing amount of HE 
delivery via Further Education and the growing convergence between Higher 
Education and FE in the future for which the Capital building programme is designed. 
We also see considerable potential to involve local authorities in some projects, given 
firstly the role of FE colleges in local regeneration and skills development, secondly, the 
Government response to the IUSS Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2008--09 11 
 
access local authorities have to capital funding, and, thirdly, the authorities' role in 16–
19 provision from 2010. Furthermore, colleges should be assisted to share best practice 
and contacts or to reduce the overall cost of their projects through shared use or 
redesign. We recommend that funding both for an innovation fund and for small 
projects is not contingent on the successful 13 Colleges making savings and is not 'top-
sliced' from the LSC capital budget. (Paragraph 140)  
In the letter from Geoff Russell to all college principles on the 23rd April he said “there may 
also be situations where colleges may decide to simply ask for more modest sums to 
refurbish.” The projects which were ultimately selected were done so without prejudice but 
were selected using open and transparent criteria which were agreed with the sector. 
Subsequently, the Association of Colleges has established a Task Group, which is being 
supported by both LSC and BIS; to look at alternative sources of funding The LSC already 
has a relationship with HEFCE in terms of capital responsibilities. Under the new 
arrangements, the local authority will have a key role in the administration of capital where 
it affects 16–19 learners. 
Conclusions and wider implications  
21. How the LSC now deals with Train to Gain and Adult Apprenticeship funding, 
where it is again having to introduce additional prioritisation because of potential over 
commitment, will need to be monitored closely. We recommend that the new Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committee maintains our scrutiny of this policy area. (Paragraph 
144)  
We note this recommendation however it is for the Select Committee to take forward. Both 
the Department and the LSC has introduced new mechanisms to determine priorities and 
these will be documented in the Skills Investment Strategy published later this year. 
22. There is an ongoing tension between demand-led and needs-based provision which 
needs to be resolved between the LSC and DIUS (now DBIS) and across government 
more widely. The Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families and the then 
Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills told the LSC Council in April 
2009 that they wanted "informed demand" rather than prioritisation on a "first come 
first served" basis. We ask DBIS to set out precisely what is meant by "informed 
demand", and how this links to the way in which the LSC and the new Skills Funding 
Agency and Young People's Learning Agency will manage their programmes. 
(Paragraph 148)  
The introduction of prioritisation criteria was in response to the need to create ‘informed 
demand’. This is the rational direction to take when fiscal circumstances are such that the 
goals of meeting all suitable demand became impractical. The criteria enabled us to ensure 
only those projects which best delivered against our policy agendas would proceed. Overall 
the sector needs to respond to learner need but all programmes need to be monitored. To 
achieve this, the LSC asked independent consultants to review all commitments and have 
in place robust financial arrangements. The LSC also went through a process of 
prioritisation to select the most urgent projects which were to progress this spending 
period.  
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23. The programme of capital investment in FE Colleges has greatly benefited some 
colleges, communities and students but in a haphazard manner. We conclude that both 
DIUS and the LSC are jointly liable for not recognising the weak points of a capital 
programme which suffered from no overall budget and poor management 
information, but which was being heavily marketed by the LSC to Colleges. A heinously 
complicated management structure within the LSC and the approaching Machinery of 
Government changes bred a lack of responsibility and gave an air of distraction. 
Everyone wanted this laudable programme to succeed and so failure became 
unthinkable. Mark Haysom alluded to this when he said "why was the capital 
programme not on the risk register? I think, well, I know, because it was seen to be a 
success, that flipping into, in record time, a situation of over-demand was not seen to 
be an issue on the radar. I am sorry, but it was not." (Paragraph 150)  
The Government accepts that mistakes were made in the management of the capital 
programme and is committed to implementing all the Foster recommendations. The 
Department fully recognises the importance of ensuring a smooth transition of the capital 
programme to the successor bodies, and has in place a robust and substantial programme 
to oversee this work. The LSC has moved to a simpler organisation structure that requires 
personal rather than diluted responsibility. It also has strengthened its risk management 
processes.  
The new Skills Funding Agency will benefit from a number of structural and procedural 
qualities that mark it out from the LSC, and demonstrate material improvements in the 
environment for risk management. As opposed to the LSC, structurally the Skills Funding 
Agency will be a nationally consistent organisation, with centralised funding systems which 
will ensure the easy availability of comprehensive and correct budget reports.  
The Skills Funding Agency will be part of BIS, and there will be clear governance, 
accountability and management chains from BIS to the Chief Executive of Skills Funding. 
This means there will be shorter timescales between the identification of risks through a 
clear escalation route and the implementation of consistent mitigating action.  
24. We believe that the greater the freedom given to arms-length agencies by 
Government departments to carry through major public expenditure programmes, the 
greater the obligation on the senior management of those agencies to observe due 
diligence over internal reviews of that expenditure. That includes being proactive in 
flagging up potential major resource problems to the sponsoring Government 
department. It is clear that this was not done in the case of LSC and DIUS. It is, above 
all, a sorry story of management within the LSC compounded by failures of 
government oversight within DIUS which is likely to cost hundreds of millions of 
pounds. (Paragraph 151)  
BIS and the LSC have also already strengthened financial controls in a number of ways. A 
particular focus of this work has been to ensure that the right relationship exists between 
the centre and the regions of the LSC and to ensure that processes are in place for 
escalating rapidly to senior BIS officials any shortcomings of failure of control. 
BIS has also recognised the importance of achieving effective delivery through partners. 
BIS will take into account all of the conclusions of the NDPB’s review conducted by the 
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then Permanent Secretary, Ian Watmore, in determining the nature of approach that BIS 
should adopt to its sponsorship responsibilities. Taking forward this work, the Department 
wishes to ensure that the improvement in processes and systems are applied across the 
department on a systematic basis, for all delivery partners, integrating all the good practice 
already identified.  
25. Looking forward, the decision-making structure will shortly become even more 
complicated as the number of organisations involved increases from three (LSC, DIUS, 
DCSF) to five (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, DCSF, Local 
authorities, Skills Funding Agency, Young People's Learning Agency). Both the 
transition to these new arrangements (which will be led by a new Department) and the 
new arrangements themselves have the potential to repeat and compound all the 
problems we have identified throughout this report. The new Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills and the new management of the LSC must ensure that this does 
not happen. (Paragraph 152) 
BIS fully recognises the importance of ensuring a smooth transition to the successor 
bodies, and has in place a robust and substantial programme to oversee this work. The new 
arrangements for the SFA will mean a demand-led system responding to the actual choices 
made by individuals and employers. The SFA will route around £4 billion of funding 
swiftly, efficiently and securely to FE colleges, private providers and the Third Sector. 
BIS fully accepts the need to ensure management of the programme is not put at further 
risk, and will ensure recommendations and conclusions from all relevant reports recently 
carried out on the programme will be taken onboard. The administration of the capital 
programme under the new Skills Funding Agency will follow the principles as set-out by 
Sir Andrew Foster. 
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